General Information
The Projects and their Members
Current and Future Activities
Activities up to now
Project Description
Project 1: Reconstructing Speech Act Theory
Project 2: Pragmatic Implications
Project 3: Speech Act and Interpretation
Project 4: Explanatory Coherence
Project 5: Computational Dialectics
Guests
Papers
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Introduction
Communication is a broad area. However, we are exclusively interested in
communicative actions, particularly in Intentionalistic Communication Theory
(first sketched by Paul Grice) and in Speech Act Theory (as developed by John
L. Austin and John R. Searle). A lot of basic questions concerning the
theorectical foundations of these two approaches are not yet generally agreed
upon. Hence, the focal point of the workshop should not be applications of
these theories, but theoretical developments.
Here is a selection of questions that we are interested in: What is the exact
difference between what was said and what was implicated? What is the relation
between the conventional meaning of the uttered sentence and what is said?
Furthermore: Assuming that we (as hearers) grasp the implicit content by
assuming the observance of certain conversational maxims on the part of the
speaker. So: What is the status of the maxims? What is the rationale behind
them? Are there just the nine maxims Grice mentioned, or might be others
needed? Or could the number of the maxims be reduced (perhaps to just one)?
What is the exact nature of the inference process by which conversational
implicata are worked out?
According to Grice communicative goals are perlocutionary goals. In contrast,
Speech Act Theory assumes that the primary goal of a communicative action is an
illocutionary goal. What is the difference between perlocutionary and
illocutionary goals? Is there a really deep gap between them? Or can we reduce
the latter ones to the former ones? What is the connection between Grice's
theory of implicatures and Speech Act Theory, in particular the connection
between the conversational maxims and illocutionary rules? Finally: Can
Intentionalistic Communication Theory and/or Speech Act Theory explain the
conventional meaning of expressions? Many people think so, but there is a lot
of disagreement how to do it exactly. Is - as Searle assumes -
"representation" the key word here? Or the communicative behavior of people?
These are just some of the many questions we are interested in. We are sure
that there will be equally interesting answers in Bielefeld.
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