







# MOORE'S PARADOX





# Moore's Paradox

*New Essays on Belief, Rationality,  
and the First Person*

MITCHELL GREEN  
*University of Virginia*  
and  
JOHN N. WILLIAMS  
*Singapore Management University*

OXFORD  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

**OXFORD**  
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford OX2 6DP

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.  
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,  
and education by publishing worldwide in

Oxford New York

Auckland Cape Town Dar es Salaam Hong Kong Karachi  
Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi  
New Delhi Shanghai Taipei Toronto

With offices in

Argentina Austria Brazil Chile Czech Republic France Greece  
Guatemala Hungary Italy Japan Poland Portugal Singapore  
South Korea Switzerland Thailand Turkey Ukraine Vietnam

Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press  
in the UK and in certain other countries

Published in the United States  
by Oxford University Press Inc., New York

© Mitchell Green and John N. Williams 2006

The moral rights of the authors have been asserted  
Database right Oxford University Press (maker)

First published 2006

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,  
stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means,  
without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press,  
or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate  
reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction  
outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department,  
Oxford University Press, at the address above

You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover  
and you must impose the same condition on any acquirer

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data  
Data available

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data  
Data available

Typeset by Laserwords Private Limited, Chennai, India  
Printed in Great Britain  
on acid-free paper by




• Q1

ISBN 0-19-928279-X 978-0-19-928279-1

1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2




**Queries in CopyRight Page**

Q1. For OUP: Please supply the printer information.



John N. Williams would like to dedicate  
this book to Vera, Ben, and Josh.

Mitchell Green would like to dedicate  
this book to Lori, Noah, and Sofia.






## *Acknowledgements*

Mitchell Green would like to thank Roberto Mariano, Dean of the School of Economics and Social Sciences at the Singapore Management University for inviting him to visit that institution for the purpose of collaborating with John N. Williams on this volume. Green's research was also supported by a Sesquicentennial Fellowship from the University of Virginia.

John N. Williams would like to thank Roberto Mariano, Dean of the School of Economics and Social Sciences at the Singapore Management University for facilitating Professor Green's visit, and the Wharton-SMU Research Centre for funding projects closely related to this book.

The Editors join in thanking Peter Momtchiloff of Oxford University Press for his judicious oversight of this project.



## *Contents*

### I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL CONTEXT

- |    |  |    |
|----|--|----|
| 1. | Introduction   | 3  |
|    | <i>Mitchell Green and John N. Williams</i>               | 3  |
| 2. | The All-Seeing Eye: A Blind Spot in the History of Ideas | 37 |
|    | <i>Roy Sorensen</i>                                      | 37 |

### II. MOORE'S PARADOX AND KNOWLEDGE

- |    |  |    |
|----|--|----|
| 3. | Moorean Absurdity: An Epistemological Analysis           | 53 |
|    | <i>Claudio de Almeida</i>                                | 53 |
| 4. | The Normative Character of Belief                        | 76 |
|    | <i>Thomas Baldwin</i>                                    | 76 |
| 5. | Moore's Paradox, Evans's Principle, and Iterated Beliefs | 90 |
|    | <i>John N. Williams</i>                                  | 90 |

### III. MOORE'S PARADOX, BELIEF, AND ASSERTION

- |    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| 6. | What Reflexive Pronouns Tell Us about Belief: A New Moore's Paradox <i>De Se</i> , Rationality, and Privileged Access | 117 |
|    | <i>Jay David Atlas</i>  | 117 |
| 7. | Moore's Paradox and the Transparency of Belief  | 146 |
|    | <i>Jonathan E. Adler and Bradley Armour-Garb</i>  | 146 |

### IV. MOORE'S PARADOX AND CONSCIOUSNESS

- |    |   |     |
|----|---|-----|
| 8. | Consciousness, Reasons, and Moore's Paradox | 165 |
|    | <i>André Gallois</i>                        | 165 |
| 9. | Moorean Absurdity and Showing What's Within | 189 |
|    | <i>Mitchell Green</i>                       | 189 |

V. ARGUMENTS FROM MOORE'S PARADOX

10. My Philosophical Position Says 'p' and I Don't Believe 'p'	217
<i>Alan Hájek</i>	217
11. Moorean Pretense	232
<i>Robert M. Gordon</i>	232
<i>Index</i>	