Archive for the 'Ausgabe 6: Räume und Grenzen' Category

The emergence of private actors has become increasingly an element of the post-Cold War world. It is this political entity and its connection with security issues that, especially in recent years, provokes heavy debates in public, in think tanks and the very centres of power. New questions arise whose core interest is mainly the role of security, which is traditionally under state’s responsibility but threatens to erode under the formation of new private authorities. Existing boundaries of power, security and responsibility are blurring, while new spaces are created – administrated by new actors. Maybe it is time to revise Max Weber’s conception of state, in which he refers to it as having the capacity to claim “the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory”. We need to come to ask ourselves if this traditional notion of statehood still exists or if state responsibilities are now taken over by private actors and, if so, what are the consequences of these developments?

In an interview with our magazine, the Washington Post-correspondent Steve Fainaru, who has been awarded in 2008 with the Pulitzer Price in the category “International Reporting”, speaks about his experience of being in Iraq, working with private agencies and living across boundaries.

Powision: Mr. Fainaru, how many times did you end up going to Iraq?

Fainaru: Well, I started going in the fall of 2004 and I finished in the fall of 2007, but there were long periods of time were I didn’t go at all and so I’ve been off and on. I probably went about ten times.

Powision: You’ve been with the army at first and I heard a lot of other journalists, too. Mostly they can cover stories inside the army but it’s not that easy to have outside stories on the “real Iraq”. You had another view when you went out, but did you felt secure all the time? How can we imagine this?

Fainaru: No not always, but we had our own security guys. We had our own private security people we hired and they would take us around. So they certainly made us feel more secure, but totally secure? – No!

Powision: To me it seems very difficult: You write about these security guys, the “bad guys” who possibly were kicked out of the army and then again you need them to keep yourself secure?

Fainaru: You know, most of the people who do this work are totally honourable. They got out of the military and they had the opportunity to make a ton of money in private companies, by doing something that they knew how to do and enjoyed doing. So it isn’t like being around the “bad guys”. And those who protected us were Iraqis, they were former Iraqi military.

Powision: How large is the capacity of private armies on the ground?

Fainaru: Nobody knows…that’s the thing.

Powision: Generally the media speaks of about 20.000 U.S. security guards on the ground. Is this number sufficient?

Fainaru: People use that number 20.000 but the numbers are not precise and you know, people have said any more between 20.000 and 100.000 and no one knows. I believe it’s probably between 30.000 and 50.000.

Powision: Is there any legal ground that restricts actions of private soldiers? In your lecture, you talked about Blackwater, nowadays called Blackwater Worldwide, the biggest American private military company you said, that there is no legal ground, in other words a real law to control these guys?

Fainaru: Not at the moment. The Iraqi government is not able to prosecute them while the U.S. government is not sure how to prosecute them – provided that they wanted to. I think it’s a combination of two problems. One is that nobody really knows what laws there are – I mean there aren’t any laws – and the other problem is – and I think this is actually the bigger problem – that even if there were laws, who would enforce them? The U.S. military and the state department, at least of what they have shown so far, seem to have no interest in actually enforcing these laws. There have been so many incidences in Iraq where security contractors have been involved in questionable shooting and there hasn’t been anybody prosecuted. That suggests to me that there is not the willingness to even try.

Powision: So there aren’t any limits at all for private companies? They can just interact and interfere however they like?

Fainaru: There are no limits, there are no rules at least that I know of. Some people will claim that they could be prosecuted under U.S. law but if that’s true it has never really been tested. Maybe there are laws and people will say there are certain laws, like the contractors law in the United States that applies to contractors who are connected to military. However, no private security contractor has ever been prosecuted under that law. There is also the military law and the military will tell you that at least some of the private security contractors can be prosecuted. But if that’s true, they haven’t done it yet.

Powision: Aren’t there conflicts arising between the U.S. army and the private agencies, because, while the latter can do whatever they want, the former has certain rules to obey?

Fainaru: Exactly there are a lot of conflicts. For example a private security team will get involved in a shooting and imagine they shoot somebody and then people will get angry about that and they will take it out on the military. So the military has to come in and clean up the “mess”. I think there is a lot of stuff around this.

Powision: So, what does the military personnel think about the private companies? Are they completely against these private agencies? Do they go as far as saying those mercenaries are not real soldiers?

Fainaru: It is mixed because all of these guys were in the military themselves. Some people think they are just doing jobs. They are paid for things they have learned in the military. Then there are other people who are having thoughts like: “They aren’t real military, they shouldn’t be doing these jobs, they get in our way, they’re over paid etc.” I don’t think one can make a clear cut.

Powision: I’m imagining the situation in Iraq as most chaotic. Do they sometimes attack each other, by accident?

Fainaru: Well, sometimes the military and the private security will accidentally attack each other. In fact, one of four guys I’ve been with who worked for a private company, but not Blackwater, got in a friendly fire incident and one of the guys was killed by the army.

Powision: In your articles you targeted the conflict of private security versus state sovereignty. You said that the control should be mostly in the hand of the government. So what would be your suggestion to address that, since boundaries between states and private authorities are blurring?

Fainaru: Well, of course it is complicated. On the one hand the decision of who can kill and die for my country seems to me a fundamental governmental function. Taking that responsibility, which is the most sober and important responsibility a government has, and to put that in the control of a private company is a very, very dangerous thing. At the same time I think that there are situations where the private security contractors can do things, the governments are unwilling to do. Like, for example, the genocide in Rwanda. The U.S. government, the United Nations and the European governments were all seemingly incapable or unwilling to step in and stop that from happening – you could have hired Blackwater. Blackwater would have gladly done it and could have done it. – They want to do it in Darfur now. So would you rather have 500.000 people killed in Rwanda because you are uncomfortable of hiring a legionary or would you rather have those people saved? I’d rather have those people saved. And that is what I think most people would have said. I am not willing to say that private security is an evil thing. But what it became in Iraq was fundamentally counter to what the United States were trying to do. It was mortally destructive in the way it was set up. That’s basically my position which I think is a little bit more nuanced.

Powision: You mentioned Rwanda; wouldn’t you say that the intervention of a private company is less a solution of the root causes than that it postpones the conflict? And isn’t it dangerous to introduce a private (business) company in such an unstable environment?

Fainaru: It is complicated. Introducing a foreign body into any country is complicating things enormously. It’s been proven particularly in Africa that governments in the developed world are unwilling to step in and prevent people from killing each other – for whatever reason. So, if there are companies who are saying that they are willing to step in and stop violence and prevent human rights atrocities from happening, I am for it. However, in Iraq Blackwater got out of control. The state department lost its responsibility to stay on top of the company and to deal with it when it was committing questionable acts. I know that raises all kinds of new questions but at the same time to me it is fundamental: dead or alive. Rwanda and Darfur are good examples that somebody has to go in and prevent the people from killing each other and innocent civilians. And who wouldn’t want that?

Powision: So, we can conclude by saying that private actors are a trend, like the business trend to outsource everything. Privatization has become a normal feature of our global world. Do you think it is a world wide trend to outsource, privatize armies?

Fainaru: It certainly seems to be a trend, most certainly for the US. There are Chinese mercenaries operating in Africa who are protecting financial interests. People want to have their interests protected and they are moving into relatively unstable environments For example, if you want to drill for oil in Nigeria, you know in forehand that it is a violent, kind of a lawless place. You just can not count on the Nigerian government to protect you. Hence you hire outside and you outsource it. Probably there will be a lot of outsourcing in Iraq because as the U.S. pulls out, the business interests are still there. They will be drilling for oil and getting involved in telecommunication and they will need protection, so they will turn to the private security companies.

Powision: How difficult was the work as a journalist within the private soldiers? Weren’t they suspicious towards you? Wondering what you are going to write? Like: “Is it going to be a bad story again?”

Fainaru: I think a lot of people were and still are suspicious. Frankly, I made a lot of people angry with some of the stuff that I wrote and I’m still making people angry. But the things I wrote are obviously true and supported by facts. Of course the private security companies want to ultimately regulate themselves and they are like everyone else, they protect their own interest. What I was pointing out in my articles was obvious to a lot of those people I talked with, but it is still painful for some of them to read. I usually try to be honest with people. So I tell them what I’m going to write before I do so. That was certainly true in this case; hence I don’t think anybody picked up the paper surprised, which does not mean that they were happy about it.

Powision: How was it in particular with those four guys, you talked about, did you cross the boundary from journalist to being a friend?

Fainaru: I think some people would argue that I did. Some people would argue that I crossed the line.

Powision: Mr. Fainaru, thank you for the interview.

Das Gespräch führte Benita S. Krebs

Die Beschäftigung mit Räumen und Grenzen wirft immer auch sofort die Frage nach allgemeinen Bewegungsmustern inner- und außerhalb dieser Konstrukte auf. Von besonderem Interesse sind dabei oftmals Bewegungen, die zwischen Räumen stattfinden und gerade Grenzen überwinden. In diesem Sinne sind die Thematiken des Raums und der Grenze ganz zweifellos mit der Thematik der Mobilität verknüpft. In diesem Beitrag soll vor allem eine Form menschlicher, geographischer Mobilität skizziert werden, die insbesondere als Konsequenz der Körperlichkeit der Individuen angesehen werden kann. Vor dem Hintergrund der so genannten Postmoderne und der damit einhergehenden Globalisierung kommt es, wie eine Vielzahl von Studien zeigt, zu einem erheblichen Anstieg geographischer Mobilitätsprozesse, die sich zudem meist über weite Distanzen erstrecken. Die Globalisierung selbst findet gewissermaßen durch eben diesen Anstieg verschiedenartiger Mobilitätsprozesse ihre begriffliche Entsprechung. Gut beforscht sind dabei Prozesse der dauerhaften geographischen Migration und der tageszyklischen Zirkulation.

Erst seit Neuestem findet eine weitere Mobilitätsform in raumbezogenen Disziplinen Beachtung, die historisch jedoch bei weitem nicht als neu angesehen werden kann: Die Mobilitätsform der Multilokalität (Mehrortigkeit). Obwohl selbst nicht neu, repräsentiert diese Art der Mobilität jedoch ganz offensichtlich neue räumliche Handlungsmuster und Raumansprüche. Um den handlungs- und entscheidungsgebundenen Prozess dieses Mobilitätsphänomens zu betonen, soll im Folgenden vor allem von Multilokation die Rede sein. Multilokation bedeutet zunächst einmal ein temporäres Alternieren zwischen zwei oder mehr Orten bzw. ein (zeitlich versetztes) mehrfaches Sich-Verorten. Multilokation steht demnach zwischen Migration und Zirkulation, sodass das Bestimmungskriterium ein konkret zeitliches sein muss. Da Zirkulation als Tagespendeln definiert wird und Migration einen dauerhaften Standortwechsel meint, beginnt Multilokation dann, wenn der Aufenthalt eines Akteurs sich mindestens über einen Tag hinaus erstreckt und endet dann, wenn kein Alternieren zwischen den Orten mehr stattfindet. So werden die beiden sich ausschließenden Mobilitätsalternativen der Migration und der Zirkulation durch den Akteur in der Strategie der Multilokation substituiert. Offen bleibt dagegen der zeitliche Aspekte der Regelmäßigkeit dieses Alternierens. Sowohl regelmäßige Pendelbewegungen als auch ein unregelmäßiger Rhythmus sind zu beobachten und damit auch konzeptionell zur Kenntnis zu nehmen.

Das Merkmal des temporären Alternierens ist allerdings nicht hinreichend, um das Phänomen adäquat zu fassen. Wenn ein Aufenthalt sich mindestens über einen Tag hinaus erstreckt, schließt er in aller Regel auch mindestens eine Übernachtung mit ein. Zwar gibt es strittige Debatten darüber was unter Wohnen zu verstehen sei, das Kennzeichen der Übernachtung wird aber von vielen Positionen anerkannt. Ein weiteres Kriterium der Multilokation ist demnach das des Wohnens an zwei oder mehr Orten: Bei Multilokalität handelt es sich um eine Form residentieller Mobilität, um ein Wohnen zwischen Mobilität und Sesshaftigkeit.[1] In diesem Sinne werden also auch die Lebensformen der Sesshaftigkeit und der (Hoch)mobilität durch die Strategie der Multilokation substituiert.

Substituiert werden aber nicht nur andere Mobilitäts- und Lebensformen, sondern temporär vor allem Orte durch andere Orte. Dem Begriff der Multilokalität ist der Begriff des Ortes schon immanent. Aus pragmatischen Gründen werden Orte häufig durch administrative Grenzen bestimmt, was jedoch zu Unschärfen führen dürfte. Auf der Basis nachgewiesener Regionalisierungsprozesse, im Rahmen derer sich alltägliche Aktionsradien über administrative Grenzen hinweg auf die regionale Ebene ausweiten, soll daher der Begriff des Standortes herangezogen werden. Ein Standort umfasst demnach verschiedene Substandorte (Wohnung, Arbeitsplatz, Kindergarten), die innerhalb des alltäglichen Aktionsradius liegen und nicht auf einen Ort im Sinne administrativer Grenzen festgelegt sind. Generell können Überlegungen zu Maßstabsfragen im Zusammenhang mit Multilokalität nur zu einer offenen Konzeption gelangen. Multilokationen können sich sowohl innerhalb einer Kommune konstituieren als sich auch über Regionen, Nationen und sogar Kontinente erstrecken.

Standorte sind aus akteurszentrierter Perspektive immer mit Standortofferten verbunden, die sich natürlich in Abhängigkeit von der subjektiven Wahrnehmung und Bewertung der multilokalen Akteure in den verschiedensten Multilokalitätsformen auch verschiedenartig darstellen. Als übergreifendes Muster kann jedoch – auch unabhängig von der individuellen Bedeutung der Standortofferten – postuliert werden, dass eine temporäre Substitution von Standortofferten eines Ortes durch Standortofferten eines anderen Ortes den eigentlichen Anlass zu einer Multilokation bietet. Grundsätzlich wird mit einer Multilokation also der individuelle Handlungsraum erweitert, wobei diese Erweiterung immer auch mit Investitionen einhergehen muss. So muss beispielsweise eine zweite oder dritte Wohnung in irgendeiner Art bewirtschaftet und es müssen Distanzen überwunden werden, weshalb generell Transitionskosten anfallen. Die Multilokationsstrategie kann in diesem Sinne als eine Grenznutzenfunktion der Standortofferten und Transitionskosten verstanden werden.

Konkrete Anlässe zu Multilokation sind natürlich vielfältig und sollen hier zur Veranschaulichung nur in berufsbedingte, freizeitinduzierte und biographieabhängige typisiert werden. Hierbei ist festzuhalten, dass diese Kategorien durchlässig und nicht trennscharf sind. Eine berufsbedingte Multilokalität kann beispielsweise immer auch durch Freizeitaspekte motiviert sein. Unter berufsbedingte Multilokationen fallen zum Beispiel Wochenendpendler (Shuttles) wie Arbeiter und Ingenieure auf Großbaustellen, die in Wohncontainern leben, Mitarbeiter der kommerziellen Luftfahrt, Studenten, die noch ein Zimmer bei den Eltern haben sowie Professoren, die einen Lehrstuhl an einem anderen Standort als den Wohnsitz der Familie besetzen aber auch Parlamentarier, deren Wahlkreis nicht am Parlamentsstandort liegt bis hin zu Albbauern, die eine Dreistufenwirtschaft betreiben. Als Beispiele für freizeitinduzierte Multilokalitäten können Dauercamper, Bewohner von Laubenkolonien, Besitzer von Wochenendhäusern oder innerstädtischen Opernwohnungen, Altersmigranten in Spanien (retirement migration) oder auch Eigentümer von Hausbooten dienen. Biographieabhängige Formen sind beispielsweise Scheidungskinder, die zwischen den Wohnungen der Elternteile pendeln und Ausprägungen des Living Apart Together (LAT – Fernbeziehungen) wie sie sich häufig bei Doppelverdienerpaaren zeigen. Multilokalität ist also keineswegs, wie häufig vermutet wird, ein Phänomen, das nur hochmobile Eliten betrifft. Es muss als ein in der Breite der Gesellschaft angekommenes Phänomen zur Kenntnis genommen werden.

Ebenso vielfältig wie das Phänomen selbst sind demnach auch die praxisrelevanten Folgen und die interdisziplinären Forschungsdesiderate. Allen voran steht das Problem der mangelnden Quantifizierung des Phänomens. Die amtliche Raumbeobachtung verfügt derzeit nicht über adäquate Instrumente zur Erhebung auch nur einer bestimmten Mutlilokalitätsform. Die Melderegister dürften nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund der Zweitwohnsitzsteuer einiger Städte ein stark verzerrtes Bild liefern. Darüber hinaus sind viele weitere Fragen offen, die aus der temporären Anwesenheit multilokaler Bewohner in Siedlungszusammenhängen resultieren. Über die infrastrukturellen Bedürfnisse (z.B. Flächenverbrauch) und Folgen (z.B. Auswirkungen auf den Verkehr) ist ebenso wenig bekannt wie über die Art und Weise eventueller lokaler politischer oder bürgerschaftlicher Partizipation. Auch die ökologischen Auswirkungen dieser Mobilitätsform sind unbeforscht. Diese Fragestellungen sind zudem nicht nur in wissenschaftlicher Hinsicht von Interesse. Stattdessen erscheint die vertiefte Beschäftigung mit einem Phänomen, das gleichsam Markt, Staat wie Zivilgesellschaft berührt, insbesondere für die Stadtplanung, für die kommunale und freie Wohnungswirtschaft, für politische Vereine und Kirchen, für öffentliche und private Verkehrsträger und weitere Entscheidungsträger zukünftig von hoher Relevanz zu sein.

1 Einen ersten Überblick zum Themenbereich der Multilokalität bietet folgender Sammelband: BBR,Gabriele Sturm & Christine Weiske (Hg.), im Druck: Multilokales Wohnen. Informationen zur Raumbeobachtung (IZR) 1/2 2009.

Hopes regarding a more peaceful world became widely disappointed nearly two decades after the fall of the Berlin wall. While the end of the cold war went along with a significant reduction of inter-state wars, new conflicts and asymmetric threats have emerged over the last decades. Today’s urban violence represents one of these conflicts. Although urban violence presents by no means a new phenomenon, the intensity of these conflicts today has been unprecedented in world history. Cities undergoing political and economic transformations have been particularly affected. Given the longevity and growing rates of violence in many cities of the southern hemisphere, physical violence as a social fact can hardly be regarded as an often proclaimed temporary sideeffect limited to the transformation process. Instead, physical violence has become endemic and contributed to changing patterns of social interaction (McCartney 2007: 17).

This article tackles the very changing governance structures and the inclusion of new actors into the process of re-negotiating power relations in a high crime area of Rio de Janeiro. Specifically, I draw on the influence of international companies to bring about changes in the concept of governing through crime in a neighbourhood of Rio’s West Zone. Like many other areas in the city, the neighbourhood of Jacarepaguá is largely characterized by the absence of an egalitarian system of public security, high levels of violence resulting from rivalries between traffickers and the police within the areas biggest slum called ‘City of God’ as well as robberies and assault attacks on the streets and highways. The latter have risen highly as industries settled and new residential areas began to emerge in the area. As a result, the local population finds itself as much affected in their everyday life as the industries in their day-to-day operations.

However, while appearing to be sheer local on the surface, the root causes for Rio’s changing patterns of governability are far more complex. Concluding from my empirical research in Rio de Janeiro, I argue that the changing concepts of governance shaping Rio’s political, social and geographical landscape today cannot be fully understood without the embeddings of Rio into processes of economic globalization. To enhance this perception, I argue that the urban violence in Rio de Janeiro represents visible reflections of the cities very own critical juncture of globalization.

Among other structural factors, urban violence has largely contributed to the cities economic stagnation over the last years (Osório 2008: 4). According to a recently published study, violence costs the state of Rio de Janeiro between 6,5 and 7,5 of Billion US Dollars annually. This represents approximately eight percent of the state’s GDP. Due to the different forms of crimes in Rio de Janeiro and the absence of a functioning system of public security, violence represents the main concern of CEO’s running the biggest companies in the state (PWC/O Globo 2007). Gang related fights and robberies inand outside company facilities have kept employers from getting to work, caused fabrication deadlock, keep qualified workers from accepting jobs in certain areas and prevented potential customers from entering business negotiations with companies located in certain parts of Rio (Carvalho 2007: 34).

But how do companies as key actors in globalization contribute to changing governance structures and the upholding of the geographically visible and culturally perceivable walls which separate the local population into socially in- and excluded parts of the Brazilian society? To answer this question one has to consider the security interests of companies operating in Rio as well as their political influence and bargaining power in order to steer the course of events according to their own interests. As Collier pointed out, the uncertainty resulting from physical violence reduces the time horizon and willingness of actors to obey contracts (Collier 1999: 8). As the formal market depends on long-term planning reliability in order to prevent financial and reputational loses from occurring, some companies have left the state or have settled in other partsof the city’s metropolitan region. Certain formally industrialized regions have been cleared out entirely as a direct consequence of growing violence (OGlobo 08/05). However, due to Rio’s topography, companies relocating their production sites within the City find themselves soon to be confronted with similar security problems in other neighbourhoods as well. The increase of shanty town areas (largely characterized by the absence of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force) play an important role in the process of generating violence. With an increase of 204.358,3 m² of Rio’s overall slum expansion of 250.279 m² between 2002 and 2007, the administration district of Jacarepaguá accounted for the biggest territorial growth of shanty towns (FIRJAN 2007: 6). Given these characteristics of Rio’s urban development, most companies in Jacarepaguá today are surrounded by slums. In order to secure their operations, local industries have started to manage their own business space and contributed to the overall trend to privatise security.[1]

During my empirical research, I identified three main pillars of security measures individually and collectively carried out by the ocal industries in order to govern through crime in the area’s complex security environment.

Situational crime prevention (SCP) represents the first and most classic form of governing through crime. While required for insurance purposes from almost all major companies worldwide, alarms, electric fences, CCTV, motion detectors and other means of situational protection inside companies have been installed by all companies interviewed in order to prevent theft and industrial espionage from company personnel as well as robberies and break-ins by external actors.

A second and individually taken security approach by most companies located in the area focuses on the employment of a comparatively small amount of inhabitants from surrounding shanty towns for lower skilled work assignments. Due to the fear of potentially falling victim to planned robberies by local people, a major concern of social project representatives and Favela administrations constantly revealed during my research was that slum inhabitants are being stigmatized as a major risk factor to business continuity. Among others, this ‘profile-based exclusion’ (Shearing et al. 2000: 88) represents a continuation of Lemgruber’s analysis according to which shanty town populations are undergoing a learning process of widely being considered a potential threat and excluded from the Brazilian society due to their place of residence (Lemgruber 2003: 55). Members of social projects and Favela administrations uphold the complaint that workers from other parts of Rio were employed and brought to work in the area instead of creating close relations with local communities. As proven in other parts of Rio however, the employment of local people from and financial investments in neighbouring shanty towns has largely improved the security situation and lowered the costs of private security.

A third pillar refers to a collective attempt by the local industries to govern through crime. Brazil’s biggest TV station (whose production studios are located in the area) as well as pharmaceutical companies initiated a concerted monthly security meeting. Under the auspices of the local association of commerce (ACIJA), the companies’ security managers, all branches of the local police, the fire and sanitarian department get together in order to negotiate measures to reduce the risk of falling victim to crimes. Considering the lack of resources by the police forces in Rio, local companies provide the police a certain amount of money to help with car acquirement and maintenance. In exchange of resources between companies and the police, the industries upgrade their own sphere of influence in the local security governance structure by primarily determining the discourse about necessary improvements within the meetings. On the other hand, interviews with company risk managers have also proven the transfer of money contributed by the companies to ACIJA via so called security consulting companies to local milícias. The relatively new phenomenon of milícias represents one of fundamental changes in the organisational principles of Rio’s urban governability. These paramilitary organized groups primarily consist of off-duty policemen and fire-fighters. While actively fighting drug dealers and keeping the streets around company and residential areas free from robbers if being paid to do so, militias continue to occupy local shanty towns previously dominated by one of Rio’s drug factions. However, considering that 65 percent of the City’s urban areas today occupied by militias have not formally been under the control of other oppressive forces, milícias have established themselves as the biggest contractors for illegal private security in the City of Rio de Janeiro. Similar to shanty towns dominated by drug factions, milícias occupy and implement restrict codes of conducts within communities. Unlike drug factions however, milícias extort monthly security fees from every citizen and shop owner inside the slums. Furthermore, milítias control other financially lucrative sources. These groups illegally gained control over alternative means of public transportation, control the distribution of gas bottles, the reception and distribution of TV signals and started to run (child-) prostitution rings within the poor communities. However, in sharp contrast to drug factions, their sphere of influence is not limited to the local slums but unfolds over residential and commercial areas alike. The milítias’ involvement in the area’s real estate speculation turned into a highly profitable business (Freixo 2008). Even more disturbing, however, appears to be the close connection with politicians who use milícias in order to gain the votes of shanty town residents during state and federal elections. Furthermore, as milícias primarily consist of policemen, investigations by the police against their illegal actions remain rare despite the implementation of parliamentary commissions of inquiry and being a prime focus of news media coverage in Rio, today. As a result, militias have contributed to a politicaleconomic change of violence within Rio (Souza Alves 2008: 33). The neighbourhood of Jacarepaguá emerged as a stronghold of these paramilitary organized groups. Due to the active involvement of policemen and influential support from politicians, the sphere between public and illegal becomes increasingly blurred in Rio de Janeiro.

Companies represent the biggest single financial contributors to milícias in Jacarepaguá. As robberies inside company facilities, attacks on workers and company vehicles have dropped tremendously, some company security personnel emphasised satisfaction about the milícias existence. However, the financing of militias strongly contributes to their growing power and influence within the region. Considering Rio’s economic downturn over the last decades, keeping companies in Rio appears to be the prime concern of the state government and the police officials. Through their actions, companies do not only ignore international codes of conducts and principles of the UN Global Compact when it comes to generating their own security. As I will show elsewhere (forthcoming dissertation) the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) methods offered by the local industries are inappropriate to enhance the strongly needed citizenship building and the creation of human security within the area. While security is more and more becoming a private and tailor-made service available to those capable to afford it, shanty town inhabitants on the other side of the company walls are increasingly suffering from the repressive methods installed by local milítias. Under the given circumstances, those historically excluded from most spheres of the Brazilian society are once again suffering the most from the demonstrated patterns of generating security by globally operating private international actors.

1 Under the given and highly inefficient public security structure, the provision of private security has turned into one of the City’s fastest growing service sectors. Between 2002 and 2007, private enterprises located in the State of Rio de Janeiro alone spent officially 11, 96 Billion Dollars (28,7 Billion Brazilian R$) on private security (Fécomercio-RJ 04/08).

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Fecomerico da cidade do Rio de Janeiro: Estatísticas Abril 2008. –in: Jornal do Brasil, 17. Abril 2008.

PriceWaterhourseCoopers/OGlobo (2007). A forca do Estado do Rio de Janeiro. OGlobo, Rio de Janeiro.

Carta da Indústria (2007) – Sistema FIRJAN – Ano IIIV – No. 358 (FIRJAN Monitora. Expansão das Favelas Cariocas.)

Herrschaft als institutionalisierte Form der Machtausübung über Untergeordnete findet nicht im Vakuum statt, sie ist politisch, sozial, kulturell, aber auch territorial situiert. Koloniale Herrschaft ist zudem dadurch gekennzeichnet, dass sie durch „landfremde Herrschaftsträger“ in einem vom „Mutterland“ meist räumlich entfernten politischen Gebilde ausgeübt wird (Osterhammel 2003: 16).

In unserem Text wollen wir einige Wechselwirkungen zwischen Raum und kolonialer Herrschaft untersuchen. Es geht darum, wie sich koloniale Herrschaftsformen in Räumen manifestieren, in diese einschreiben und von diesen bedingt werden.[1]

1. Begrenzung: Diskursive Konstitution des Innen – Außen

Das koloniale Territorium wurde in Verträgen mit anderen Kolonialmächten und der in der Kolonie lebenden Bevölkerung festgesetzt. Auch das Verhältnis der Kolonie zum sozialen, kulturellen und rechtlichen Raum der jeweiligen „Metropole“ musste bestimmt werden. Die Grenzziehung war schwierig und hing von der jeweiligen Form der Kolonialisierung ab. Die Frage, ob die Kolonien zum Innen(raum) des kolonisierenden Reiches gehörten oder ein Außen darstellten und wie dieses Außen gegenüber den anderen Außen des „Auslands“ definiert war, bildete Gegenstand kolonialrechtlicher Debatten. So gab es sowohl in Japan als auch in Deutschland Auseinandersetzungen über den rechtlichen Status der Kolonien und die Frage, ob es sich bei den Kolonien um Aus- oder Inland handelte.[2] Eine Erklärung der Kolonien zum gleichberechtigten Inland hätte zugleich alle für die „Metropole“ geltenden Gesetze in den Kolonien in Kraft gesetzt und damit weitreichende Folgen für die Regierung der Kolonien gehabt. Sowohl für die deutschen Kolonien, wie für Taiwan wurde eine Regel gefunden, die der Kolonie einen Zwischenstatus gab, d.h. sie als Anderes, nicht Zugehöriges konstituierte, ohne damit den Herrschaftsanspruch aufzugeben.

2. Räumliche Bedingungen kolonialer Herrschaft

Größe, tektonische Bedingungen, materielle Beschaffenheit, aber auch das Klima der zu erobernden Gebiete bedingten die räumlichen Erfahrungen der Kolonisierenden und wirkten sich auf die Formen der Herrschaftsetablierung und -ausübung aus. Es machte wesentliche Unterschiede, ob es sich um Küsten- oder Bergregionen, schwach oder stark besiedelte Gebiete handelte. Auch die Distanz zwischen der Kolonie und der „Metropole“ beeinflusste die Formen von Herrschaft. Die Kontrollmöglichkeiten der „Metropole“ auf lokale Umsetzungen politischer Entscheidungen nahm mit der Distanz ab. Eine zentrale Rolle kam den Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten als Überwindung von Entfernung zu. Die Unwissenheit über die geographischen Gegebenheiten trug dazu bei, dass (anfangs) weite Teile der Kolonien nicht direkt von der Herrschaftsausübung betroffen waren. Ihren Wissensvorteil über die örtlichen Gegebenheiten konnte die ansässige Bevölkerung z.B. auch in militärischen Auseinandersetzungen strategisch einsetzen.

3. Herrschaftlicher Zugriff auf den kolonialen Raum

Effektive Kontrolle war gerade zu Beginn der Kolonialisierung auf wenige Gebiete beschränkt und abhängig von der teilweise nur temporären physischen Präsenz der Kolonisierenden.

Peripatetische und temporäre Herrschaft spielten im Kolonialismus eine wichtige Rolle. Gerade zu Beginn der Kolonialherrschaft bestanden oft große Unterschiede zwischen den Orten dauerhafter Präsenz verfestigter Kolonialherrschaft wie den Stationen und den Bereichen, wo Kolonisierende nur sporadisch oder gar nicht anwesend waren.[3] Inwieweit diese “Inseln der Herrschaft” (Pesek) dann in ein engmaschigeres Netz von kolonialer Kontrolle und einer dauerhaften Überwachung überführt werden konnten, hing von spezifischen lokalen Entwicklungen (z.B. Widerstand der Bevölkerung) sowie nationalen Faktoren (z.B. Budget für Administration) ab.[4]

Vier unterschiedliche Strategien, durch welche die koloniale Herrschaft auf den Raum zugriff und sich in diesen einschrieb, sind für die deutsche und japanische Kolonialherrschaft von besonderer Bedeutung:

1. Die kartographische Vermessung und anschließende Zuteilung war Bedingung und Folge der Durchsetzung von Herrschaft im Raum und erleichterte effektive Kontrolle, z.B. im Anlegen von befestigten Posten an strategisch wichtigen Stellen. Die amtliche Vermessung eines Gebietes galt als Ausdruck der Gebietshoheit (Gareis 1902: 29). Sie war aber auch für das Festschreiben von Landeigentum von Bedeutung.

2. Die Regelung des Zugangs zum Boden als einer wesentlichen wirtschaftlichen Ressource war zugleich Teil und Voraussetzung kolonialer Herrschaft. Die Inbesitznahme des Bodens als Teil der wirtschaftlichen Ausbeutung des kolonialen Raums und die Regelung der Besitzverhältnisse eröffnete ein Konfliktfeld zwischen Kolonisierenden und Kolonisierten.[5] Mittel der kolonialen Landerwerbung waren gewaltsame Besetzungen, Kaufverträge und die Aneignung durch Landgesetzgebung, bei der lokale Rechtsformen weitgehend ignoriert worden (Fisiy 1996: 227).

3. Die technische Erschließung, die Nutzbarmachung des Bodens und der Ausbau von Verkehrswegen dienten der Ressourcennutzung und der Beherrschung des kolonialen Raums.[6] Die „Modernisierung“ fungierte als eine Legitimationsstrategie der kolonialen Herrschaft, welche zentral die Möglichkeit der Naturbeherrschung durch moderne Technik(en) betonte. Auf der Ebene kolonialer Fantasien stellte die Zähmung des manchmal bedrohlichen, fremden Raumes mit Hilfe von Technik und Wissenschaft einen Fortschritt der bürgerlichen Zivilisationsgeschichte dar (Kundrus 2003: 160).

4. Wichtige Untermauerung der materiellen Inbesitznahme war die symbolische Überschreibung des kolonialen Raums durch die Änderung von Ortsnamen, die Errichtung von Bauten nach „modernen“ Maßstäben und die Aufstellung von Denkmälern. Auch die Inszenierung von Paraden oder Festtagen sollte die koloniale Herrschaft sichtbar machen.

4. Schluss

Die von uns herausgegriffenen Aspekte zeigen, dass die Räumlichkeit der Kolonien für deren Beherrschung wesentliche Bedeutung hatte. Die Gegebenheiten des Raums wirkten auf die sich ausbildenden Formen der Regierung, genauso wie diese in den Raum eingriffen und ihn umgestalteten. Raum und Regierung befanden sich also in einem wechselseitigen Prozess: Raum war Bedingung der Regierung und Regierung war Teil von Raumkonstitution.

Die topographischen Gegebenheiten der jeweiligen Gebiete sowie die Intensität der Raumeinwirkung bedingten die jeweiligen Formen der Kolonialherrschaft. Die Konstitution der Kolonien erfolgte über diskursive Aushandlungsprozesse, die zum Teil in rechtlichen Festschreibungen mündeten. Bei der Herrschaftsausübung griffen Kolonialmächte häufig auf Herrschaftspraktiken wie die Segregation und die symbolische Besetzung von Orten zurück. Eine wichtige Legitimation dieser Raumbesetzung stellte der Diskurs über die notwendige und benevolente „Zivilisierung“ der Kolonisierten bereit. Besonders in wenig erschlossenen Gebieten blieben solche symbolischen wie realen Raumbesetzungen allerdings instabil und fragmentarisch. Die Grenzen des kolonialen Herrschaftsanspruchs konstitutionierten sich in erster Linie durch die Grenzen des eroberten territorialen Raums. Die Grenzen der Kolonien wurden durch Verhandlungen in der internationalen Gemeinschaft und ebenso durch Eroberung oder Übertragungsverträge mit den lokalen Bevölkerungen festgelegt. Die tatsächliche herrschaftliche Durchdringung dieser formal begrenzten Territorien war damit aber keinesfalls gewährleistet. Sie erfolgte in einem Prozess der zunehmenden materiellen und symbolischen Inbesitznahme, deren Dichte von den jeweiligen materiellen, politischen und sozialen Bedingungen in der Kolonie abhingen. Der Herrschaftsanspruch ging vielfach weiter als das tatsächlich beherrschte Territorium.

Fußnoten

1 Wir tun dies vor dem Hintergrund unser eigenen Forschungen zur japanischen Kolonialherrschaft in Taiwan und der deutschen Kolonialherrschaft in Afrika, werden diese Beispiele aus Platzgründen aber nicht ausführlich diskutieren.

2 Eine Aufarbeitung der rechtswissenschaftlichen Debatten in Deutschland aus juristischer Perspektive ohne historische Einordnung liefert Wagner (2002: 177-221), für die japanische rechtliche Diskussion siehe: Chen 1984: 242-247.

3 Michael Pesek, der die Kolonialgeschichte Deutsch-Ostafrikas als Geschichte der Präsenz des kolonialen Staates und seiner Akteure beschreibt, benutzt zur Veranschaulichung der Lückenhaftigkeit institutionalisierter Machtausübung durch die Kolonisierenden das Bild „Inseln von Herrschaft“ (Pesek 2005: 190).

4 Japan entwickelte in Taiwan über ein System von Polizeipatrouillen zum Beispiel eine dichte Kontrolle über das koloniale Territorium.

5 Für Taiwan vgl. Ka 1995, für Kamerun vgl. Eckert 1999.

6 Zur Bedeutung deutscher Infrastrukturprojekte in Afrika vgl. van Laak (2004).

Literatur

Chen, Edward (1984): The Attempt To Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives, in: Myers Ramon H. (Hrsg.): The Japanese Coloniale Empire, 1895-1945, Princeton, 240-274.

Eckert, Andreas (1999): Grundbesitz, Landkonflikte und kolonialer Wandel. Douala 1880-1960 (Beiträge zur Kolonial- und Überseegeschichte 70), Stuttgart.

Fisiy, Cyprian F. (1996): Techniques of Land Acquisition. The concept of “Crown Lands” in Colonial and post-colonial Cameroon, in: Debusmann, Robert/Arnold, Stefan (Hrsg.): Land Law and Land Ownership in Africa. Case Studies from Colonial and Contemporary Cameroon and Tanzania (Bayreuth African studies series 41), Bayreuth, 223-254.

Gareis, Karl (1902): Deutsches Kolonialrecht. Eine orientierende Schilderung der aussereuropäischen Erwerbungen des deutschen Reiches und Darstellung ihrer Rechtsordnung nebst dem Text und Erläuterungen der diese Schutzgebiete betreffenden Gesetze und Kaiserlichen Verordnungen, 2. verb. Auflage, Gießen.

Ka, Chih-ming (1995): Japanese Colonialism in Taiwan. Land Tenure, Development, and Dependency, 1895-1945, Boulder, CO.

Kundrus, Birthe (2003): Moderne Imperialisten. Das Kaiserreich im Spiegel seiner Kolonien, Köln.

Laak, Dirk van (2004): Imperiale Infrastruktur. Deutsche Planungen für die Erschließung Afrikas 1880-1960, Paderborn.

Pesek, Michael (2005): Koloniale Herrschaft in Deutsch-Ostafrika, Frankfurt/Main.

Osterhammel, Jürgen (2003): Kolonialismus. Geschichte, Formen, Folgen, München.

Wagner, Norbert Berthold (2002): Die deutschen Schutzgebiete. Erwerb, Organisation und Verlust aus juristischer Sicht (Juristische Zeitgeschichte, Abt. I, Allgemeine Reihe 11), Baden-Baden.

If International Relations (IR) would be a talk show, its producers would surely select “space” as one of the first topics to be discussed. Not only since the end of the Cold War and the dissolving of bi-polarity, but at the latest since spatial turn and the phenomenon of “globalisation” have entered IR show business “space” figures prominently in the accompanying discourses.[1]

The talk show producers would thus try to bring together a qualitative and controversial selection of experts and politicians on the topic: One expert would be invited to represent realism that is even by their critics widely regarded as the most influential theoretical tradition in IR. He or she would argue for spaces being territorially fixed entities based on states as aggregated and unitary units of analysis due to their supreme political authority in the world.

The representative of the opposite standpoint would challenge this state-centric ontology and epistemology of the rationalist position by understanding spaces as social constructs and emphasising the fact that “space” is not just out there but an intersubjective construction of people as a purely intellectual and ideational creation which is not based on material forces.

If the editor in chief recently reads a book about new regionalism, he or she would invite an academic expert who would discuss the role of regions in today’s multi-spatial relations and emphasise the increasing importance of regions in a globalised world. He or she would for the most part support the representative of a progressive perspective, stating that spaces are socially constructed phenomena and containers of culture and norms which are continuously transformed and thus form complex and dynamic processes.

Political expertise on the question of interconnectedness of international, regional, national and local spaces would be represented by an official from the European Union (EU). As the EU refers to itself as “global actor” that promotes its model of regional integration while trying to align its member states to a commonly accepted constitution, its representative is expected to clarify the role and function of space.

The round of talks would inevitably start with the moderator’s question of what defines space. After about 30 minutes of fierce talk the round would come to a first conclusion that, unfortunately, one has to live with the quite uncomfortable fact that space does not come with a concise definition.

On a typical “Global Studies” evening, the audience in front of the television would be composed of five to ten different nationalities and would by the time of that statement at full volume discuss the multiplicity of “Global Studies spaces”. Interestingly enough, such “educational space(s)” have been hardly covered by academic discussion, albeit the EU has spent quite some time and money to promote inner-European and international exchange programmes for both students and lectures, and its Erasmus Mundus programmes are the latest achievement in that matter. Those master programmes share the internationality of their students and, coming back to spaces, students are connected to a multispatiality that constitutes indeed one, if not the most significant characteristic of the Erasmus Mundus master programmes.

If Global Studies students were to draw a map of the multiplicity of paths they travel and spaces they interact within the two years they participate in the programme, it would show a quite complex visualization of spaces. It would include important nonterritorial spaces like facebook, skype or moodle and at the same time be tied to very territorially-based unites like embassies, university administrations or libraries. Theoretical discussions about re- and de-territorialisation becomes a very present everyday issue.

Regarding the “usual spaces” IR refers to, Global Studies spaces would certainly correspond with national borders, especially in administrative matters when applying for visa, residence permits, or insurance. But nation-states would mainly serve as symbolic terms of reference for sceptical family members or inquiring future employers. It somehow is to be much easier to refer to studying in “Germany” or “South Africa”, than in “Leipzig” or “Stellenbosch”.

But in reality, local connections with cities are much stronger. One spends a while only to find his or her ways around in Vienna, Wroclaw, London or Leipzig and those local “imagined communities” are already quite a challenge to capture when coming to Europe for the first time. And even though most students do take the opportunity to travel to other cities and countries, the two or three cities one studies and lives in within the two years become a home for most and leave their impressions.

“Home” might be the most interesting and challenging space in these two years. The English-German dictionary lists both “Zuhause” and “Heimat” as possible translations. The first option proverbially refers to a territorially fixed building that usually shelters one’s closest family (whose definition is likewise challenging, but not to be taken up in this context), but also refers to the surrounding of extended family and friends. At the same time, participating in an international master programme will also provide one with a “new home” abroad and a family whose patchwork covers not only fellow students but also their families, programme coordinators and lecturers. At this point, those programmes become more than just an “educational space”. They become your daily life where discussing Northern and Southern American relations with fellow students from China and Kenya in the morning seminar, chatting with friends in India and Ukraine at the same time on skype over lunch and preparing your move to the next city and/ or another continent seems to be nothing unusual and making “the world” a quite tangible space.

But how would “Heimat” be defined in that case? Would it be the connection between the two “homes” and the many more spaces one interacts with? Coming back to the Global Studies map, one is tempted to ask: Is it a multiplicity of overlapping spaces (if they are overlapping at all) that construct a multispatial world, or is it in fact one space crossing over those individual spaces and blending them into one? Would it be possible to draw its border(s)? But then how would one define what’s inside and outside those borders?

Bhabha’s concept of hybridity might offer a creative approach to these questions where multispatial interactions “should not be seen to form a distinct and self-contained cultural space but to signal a process of ‘cultural translation’”.[2] Bhabha proposes that identities are inevitably hybridized, because the spaces of social life are formed through a rupturing of boundaries. Following this idea, mapping Global Studies should be opened up to the paths students pursue after their graduation. Of the class of 2007, about half of the graduates moved back to their home countries, one quarter stayed in the countries of their second year placement and about one other quarter qualifies as “movers” who are still travelling and moving between spaces and places.

For the first group, Global Studies constitutes a temporal space on their map that nevertheless still plays a vital role in both their professional and private networks. For those still staying in Europe, living in-between spaces has become an everyday situation shared with so many other work migrants. The later group might rather qualify for “hyper-bridity” as their spatial setups are exceedingly in flux.

In the end, and paraphrasing Wendt, spaces are what you make of it. This “definition” does by no means make discussing and researching them any easier. Those spaces might cut through the “usual spaces” one would think about in the first place and challenge not only one’s way of thinking but one’s imagination and understanding of a potential spatial order. There is not one Global Studies space, but everyone will construct his or her’s according to his or her individual background, needs, hopes and experiences. Maybe a round of talks would in the end agree on the consensus that Global Studies provides a kind of spatial template that, depending on the “raw material”, will produce a variety of “final products” (or processes, as Bhabha would argue). What they have in common is the ability to navigate within, between and through different spaces, places and processes. This will, again, not make a definition of any of those concepts easier. But it will contribute to a production of knowledge and experience that is needed to better understand globalisation. And this topic could then be discussed in the next talk show.

Fußnoten

1 Strands of academic discussion on the historicity of globalisation do not agree on globalisation being only a recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, the term itself has gained extensive attention only after the end of the Cold War.

2 Hubbard, P., R. Kitchen and G. Valentine (eds.) 2004. Key Thinkers on Space and Place. London et al.: Sage Publications, p. 54.